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THE ROAD TO ARTIFICIAL SUPER-





In recent years, the rapid development of artificial intelligence and its use in
civil and military robots1, drones2 and other machines particularly in regional
armed conflicts, have been of concern to a number of scientists, engineers,
philosophers and the public at large.3 Eventually, in the not-too-distant future,
could fully autonomous machines of artificial general super-intelligence create an
existential threat to the human race?
Is it realistic to believe that fully autonomous machines more intelligent than
humans could take over the earth and end life as we know it, or is this science
fiction? Many divergent views have been expressed among artificial intelligence
experts. Some believe that a human level of fully autonomous artificial
intelligence could be developed before midcentury and a super-human level of
fully autonomous artificial intelligence in all domains of interest soon thereafter.4
* O.C., Q.C., O.Ont., B.Sc., J.D., S.J.D., L.L.D., F.R.S.C., Distinguished Research
Professor Emeritus, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto.
** Hons. B.A. with distinction, U. ofWesternOnt., Certificate of International Affairs and
Multilateral Governance, Geneva Graduate Institute of International Law and
Development Studies, L.L.B., B.C.L., McGill U., Barrister & Solicitor, Toronto
mcastel@logoslp.com.
1 A type of machine that can be remote-controlled, partially autonomous or fully
autonomous as it moves itself or objects in order to carry out tasks.While robots always
have controllers and actuators, remote-controlled robots may lack onboard sensors:
John Long, Robotics, DVD (Chantilly, Virginia: The Great Courses, 2015) [Long].
2 Any unmanned aerial vehicle, especially one that can fly autonomously (using GPS or
other navigational data) and beyond the line of sight needed for radio-controlled
aircraft: ibid.
3 See Nick Bostrom, Superintelligence: Paths, Dangers, Strategies (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2014) [Bostrom].
4 Ibid. The purpose of the Centre for the Study of Existential Risk at the University of
Cambridge (online: <cser.org>) and the Future of Humanity Institute at Oxford
University (online: <https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/>), both in the United Kingdom, is to
study the potential threats posed by emerging technologies. This is also the case for the
Future of Life Institute created in 2014 byMax Tegmark of theMassachusetts Institute
of Technology. Note that Bill Gates, Elon Musk and Stephen Hawking have expressed
concerns about artificial intelligence: James Barrat, ‘‘Why Stephen Hawking and Bill
Gates Are Terrified of Artificial Intelligence”, (4 September 2015), The World Post,
Today, the most pressing issues arise with respect to the use of partially
autonomous unmanned military drones in the air and water and the use of
partially autonomous robots replacing human soldiers on the battlefield. Are
these dual-use machines a first step towards fully autonomous machines reaching
a level of general super-intelligence in all domains of interest not attainable by
the human race and totally outside its control? Is this possible? Is it desirable? If
not desirable, how and by whom can it be prevented or controlled on the
national and international levels?5
Part I of this article deals with the road to artificial general super-intelligence.
Part II addresses the controls, if any, that should be exercised over the
production and use of partially or fully autonomous machines of artificial
intelligence before and after they become super-intelligent. More particularly,
should there be legal and ethical limits to their use and to what extent should
international law play a role in this connection?
I. THE ROAD TO ARTIFICIAL GENERAL SUPER-INTELLIGENCE6
The human brain has capabilities not possessed by other living creatures
which have enabled the human race to dominate the planet. This is due to a
online: <www.huffingtonpost.com/james-barrat/hawking-gates–artificial-intelligen-
ce_b_7008706.html>. Compare Raffi Khatchadourian, ‘‘The Doomsday Invention:
Will artificial intelligence bring us utopia or destruction?” The New Yorker (23
November 2015), online: <www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/11/23/doomsday-in-
vention-artificial-intelligence-nick-bostrom>. See also ‘‘The Dawn of Artificial Intelli-
gence”,The Economist, (9May 2015) 11; ‘‘TheRise of theMachines”, The Economist, (9
May 2015) 18; Agnese Smith, ‘‘Artificial Intelligence”, National 24;4 (Fall 2015) 19.
5 Most of the periodical literature is concerned with banning or restricting the use of
autonomousweapon systems notwith super-intelligence. See e.g. PWSinger, ‘‘Robots at
War: The New Battlefield” The Wilson Quarterly (Winter 2009), online: <www.wil-
sonquarterly.com/essays/robots-war-new-battlefield>; Losing Humanity: the Case
Against Killer Robots (Cambridge: Harvard International Human Rights Clinic, 2012)
[Losing Humanity]; Michael N. Schmitt, ‘‘Autonomous Weapon Systems and Interna-
tional Humanitarian Law: A Reply to the Critics”, online: (2013) Harvard National
Security Journal Features 1 <harvardnsj.org>; Nils Melzer, Human Rights Implica-
tions of the Usage of Drones and Unmanned Robots in Warfare (Brussels: European
Union Parliament, 2013); Noel E. Sharkey, ‘‘The Evitability of Autonomous Robot
Warfare” (2012), 94:886 Int Rev Red Cross 787; Ronald Arkin, ‘‘Lethal Autonomous
Systems and the Plight of the Non-combatant” (2013) 137 AISB Quarterly 1; Report of
the ICRCMeeting onAutonomousWeapon Systems (Geneva, Switzerland: International
Committee of the Red Cross, 26-28 March 2014); Peter Asaro, ‘‘On Banning
Autonomous Weapon Systems: Human Rights, Automation, and the Dehumanization
of Lethal Decision-making” (2012), 94:886 Int Rev Red Cross 687; Kenneth Anderson
and Matthew Waxman, ‘‘Law and Ethics for Autonomous Weapons Systems: Why a
Ban Won’t Work and How the Laws of War Can” (2013) Hoover Institution Research
Paper No. 2013-11 <hoover.org>.
6 This part is based on the works of Bostrom, supra note 3; Long, supra note 1; Stuart
Russell and Peter Norvig, Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach, 3rd ed (Upper
Saddle River: Prentice Hall, 2009). See also ‘‘Special Report: Robots, ”The Economist
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human’s ability to think abstractly and communicate abstract thoughts to others.
Humans are also able to accumulate information over the generations that
preceded them. Since the industrial revolution, the rate of human intellectual
development has accelerated to the point where humans are now building very
powerful intelligent machines in some specific domains. A good example is the
work, beginning in the 1950’s, which led to the Internet.
If we humans succeed in building machines that surpass our intelligence in all
domains of interest, our fate may depend on their actions. What if they are
unfriendly and do not agree to abide by established human values?
Presently, partially autonomous machines of artificial intelligence like
computers and robots are as intelligent as humans, though their software
limits the tasks they can perform. That is the extent of their autonomy. Within
these limits they have definite advantages over even an enhanced biological
human brain, since humans cannot outsmart digital intelligence. Besides
computing faster than a human brain, they can store more information, are
more reliable and efficient in retrieving it, and last longer. Their ability to edit
and upgrade their software is another advantage.7
For instance, computers are used in mathematical calculations, reservation
systems for air and other transportation, email traffic, internet services,
automated stock trading, self-driving cars, voice and face recognition, business
and home service, military tasks, smartphones, digital cameras, translation,
cloud computing, spam filters, and any technology involved in the storage and
retrieval of information. Equipped with robotic bodies, these machines of narrow
artificial intelligence can substitute for humans’ physical and intellectual labour.
They are cheap, capable, reliable, and programmed to do everything that does
not require thinking. However, they are not yet able to do what humans can do
without thinking. As long as these types of machines of artificial intelligence are
programmed to perform only certain tasks better than humans and are not fully
autonomous, they do not pose an existential threat.
In light of the artificial intelligence research taking place in a number of
states, it is likely that scientists, computer engineers and programmers will soon
be capable of developing software and hardware that give machines the same
level of autonomy and general intelligence as humans.8 These machines could
(29March, 2014); JamesBarrat,OurFinal Invention:Artificial Intelligence and theEnd of
the Human Era (NewYork: ThomasDunne Books, 2013) esp. ch. 10;Martin Ford, Rise
of the Robots: Technology and the Threat of a Jobless Future (New York: Basic Books,
2015) esp. at 229ff; Ray Kurzweil, The Age of Spiritual Machines: When Computers
ExceedHuman Intelligence (NewYork: Penguin, 1999);RayKurzweil,TheSingularity is
Near: When Humans Transcend Biology (New York: Penguin, 2005).
7 Presently, one of the world’s fastest supercomputer is China’s Tianhe-2 which has very
large hardware, uses megawatts of power and costs US $390 million to build. Its total
calculations per second can reach 33.86 Petaflop/s (quadrillions) which is much more
than a human brain’s capacity to calculate. See Jack Dongarra, ‘‘Visit to the National
University for Defense Technology Changsha, China” (2013), online: <http://
www.netlib.org/utk/people/JackDongarra/PAPERS/tianhe-2-dongarra-report.pdf>.
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then pass on what they would learn to all computers, creating an immense
collection of digital intelligence at their disposal for future development.
The final, unavoidable step would be the creation of machines and robots
capable of acquiring super-intelligence, described tentatively by Nick Bostrom as
‘‘. . . any intellect that greatly exceeds the cognitive performance of humans in
virtually all domains of interest.”9
Though originally programmed to reach a level of human general intelligence
and autonomy, the machines would reprogram themselves by rewriting their
software repeatedly at computer speed to increase their own intelligence and, by
virtue of the law of accelerated returns, attain super-intelligence. The result of
these recursive self-improvements would be an intelligence explosion through
which they would become more intelligent than humans. Now fully autonomous
and free from the instructions in their original software, they would be able to
protect themselves against any attempt by humans to turn them off.
With super-intelligence comes power. Once fully operative and no longer
facing any opposition, the super-intelligent, fully autonomous machine or robot
would be the most powerful being in the history of life on Earth. The advantages
obtained through hardware and software honed by artificial intelligence would
be immense and suggest the ability to change or destroy humanity. Therein lays
the existential threat for the human race. Once we share the planet with machines
more intelligent than we are, we would face a technological singularity since we
could no longer predict the future beyond the event horizon. Everything known
about the world would become irrelevant.
The question is whether machines, starting with a level of general human
intelligence, can evolve to super-intelligence without the intervention of a
programmer in the same way the blind evolutionary process resulted in the
present level of general human intelligence. It is also possible for a programmer
to develop a genetic evolution algorithm to run on a super-fast computer in order
to achieve results comparable to those of biological evolution. Another method
would be for a programmer to evolve a human level of artificial intelligence to
super-intelligence by starting with a human brain as a template. However, it may
end up with a cognitive architecture, values, goals and emotions unlike those of
humans.
II. CONTROLS TO BE EXERCISED OVER THE PRODUCTION AND
USE OF PARTIALLY OR FULLY AUTONOMOUS MACHINES OF
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE BEFORE AND AFTER BECOMING
SUPER-INTELLIGENT
Recently, humanitarian non-governmental organizations like Human Rights
Watch have expressed doubt as to whether partially or fully autonomous
8 See Carl Shulman &Nick Bostrom, ‘‘How Hard is Artificial Intelligence? Evolutionary
Arguments and Selection Effects” (2012) 19:7-8 J of Consciousness Studies 103.
9 Bostrom, supra note 3 at 22; See also Bostrom at 52.
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machines taking the place of humans in civil and international armed conflicts
would be able to meet international humanitarian obligations, especially with
respect to the duty to protect civilians.
Already, there is quite extensive use of lethal, partially or fully autonomous
robotic systems on the ground, air and sea in various parts of the world including
Afghanistan, Ukraine, Pakistan, Iraq, Syria, Somalia and Yemen, primarily
against IS, the Taliban, Al-Qaeda and other terrorist or rebel groups. However,
these weapons have not always given their users an asymmetric advantage.10
Lethal autonomous weapons systems raise important issues. For instance,
could unmanned partially or fully autonomous robots and drones reliably
separate enemy soldiers or terrorists from civilians on the battlefield or
elsewhere? Would their lack of human emotions prevent them from showing
mercy or compassion when facing wounded or surrendering human soldiers or
civilian victims? So far, scientists, computer engineers and programmers have not
yet succeeded in developing software or source codes that contain new cognitive
modules and skills enabling robots to feel emotions essential to our humanity.
These would include compassion for humans or even for other robots, general
concern for humans and their welfare in general, scientific curiosity and moral
goodness. However, since the science of artificial intelligence has not yet reached
the physical limits of technology, it is probable that in the future programmers
will impart in robots legal and ethical values based on international
humanitarian law.11
Another important issue is whether autonomous robots or drones equipped
with a quick draw response12 can be trusted. They may become too creative and
not follow orders. More generally, will war waged by remote control become too
easy and too tempting since robots will save human lives by dispensing with the
use of humans on the battlefield? Knowing that the only entities at risk are
machines, there will be little incentive to settle a dispute by diplomacy or other
non-lethal methods. War could become trivialized as a global spectator sport to
be watched on a laptop computer, iPhone or television.
Considering that a large number of states are now working on autonomous
lethal weapons, including robots, the High Contracting Parties to the 1980
Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional
Weapons which May Be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate
10 For instance, on the ground theU.S.A. uses theMarc-Bot, amulti-function agile control
robot, the Talon and the Pack-BotKiller P.D., while in the air it usesmultiple drones like
the Reaper, armed with hell fire missiles, and the smaller Predator, both remotely
controlled. Other drones are the Wasp, the Raven, the Shadow and the Global Hawk.
Someof these are the size of insects. Eachhave adifferent function. SeePWSinger,Wired
for War: The Robotics Revolution and Conflict in the Twenty-First Century (New York:
Penguin Press, 2009); Schmitt, supra note 5 at 3-8;LosingHumanity, supra note 5 at 6-21.
11 Social robots reacting to human emotions are in theworks. SeeLong, supranote 1 at 455;
Pascale Fung, ‘‘Robots with Heart”, Scientific American, 313:5 (November 2015) 61.
12 Automatic instant response to a perceived threat without time to reflect.
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Effects and Protocols13 (CCW), decided at their 2013 annual meeting that an
informal meeting of experts in robotics should be convened. At the meeting,
which took place in Geneva fromMay 13 to 16, 2014 and engaged mostly experts
from states party to the CCW, including Canada, they considered whether the
production and use of lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS) should be
prohibited in all circumstances and, in the context of the objectives and purposes
of the CCW, become enshrined in a new Protocol (number VI ) or some other
form of international legal instrument. At the second informal meeting of these
experts held on April 13-17, 2015, a consensus emerged that work on lethal
autonomous weapons should continue in order to reach a definite commitment
that their use requires meaningful human control. At the November 12-13, 2015
Meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the CCW, the majority of delegations
agreed that discussions should continue on LAWS within the CCW and
approved the view that matters of life and death should not be delegated to
machines. As a result a third informal meeting of experts is to be held in April
2016 to prepare a report for the next CCW meeting in December 2016, at which
time the High Contracting Parties will make key decisions with respect to LAWS
and also consider legal reviews of new weapons as required for states party to the
Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions.14
13 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons
which may be deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects (with
Protocols I, II and III) 10 October 1980, 1342 UNTS 137 (entered into force Dec. 2,
1983). The Convention serves as an umbrella for Protocols dealing with specific
weapons, such as non-detectable fragments (Protocol I), mines and booby-traps
(Protocol II), incendiary weapons (Protocol III), blinding laser weapons (Protocol IV),
and explosives remnants of war (Protocol V). According to article 1 of the Convention,
‘‘The Convention and its annexed Protocols apply to situations referred to in Art. 2
common to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 for the Protection of War
Victims [1950, 75 UNTS 287] including any situation described in paragraph 4 of Art. 1
of Additional Protocol I [1977, 1125 UNTS 3] to these Conventions” (scope of
application, e.g. colonial wars of liberation, armed struggles against racist regimes).
14 Additional Protocol I, supra note 13 Art. 36. For the history of CCW and LAWS, see
Final Report 2014 Session of High Contracting Parties CCW/MPS/2014/9 paras. 5, 23-
24;UNOGOR2014, Report of the InformalMeeting of Experts on Lethal Autonomous
Weapons Systems, CCW/MPS/2014/3; Ray Acheson, ‘‘Bombing, burning, and killer
robots: report from the 2015 CCW meeting of high contracting parties”, Reaching
Critical Will (13 November 2015) online: <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org>. See
also Expert Meeting of International Committee of the Red Cross, 26-28 March 2014,
Report on Autonomous weapon systems: technical, military, legal and humanitarian
aspects, online: <icrc.org>. Note that a Campaign to Stop Killer Robots strongly
supports a preventive ban of lethal autonomous weapons systems: ‘‘Step Up The CCW
Mandate” (June 2015), Campaign to Stop Killer Robots (blog), online: <www.stopkil-
lerrobots.org/2015/06/mandateccw>. The International Committee for Robot Arms
Control (ICRAC) also supports this campaign: Matthew Bolton, ‘‘ICRAC closing
statement to the 2015UNCCWExpertMeeting” (17April 2015), ICRAC (blog), online:
<http://icrac.net/2015/04/icrac-closing-statement-to-the-2015-un-ccw-expert-meet-
ing>.
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There are precedents with respect to chemical15, biological16 and nuclear
weapons17, the use of which has been banned or restricted. The difficulty would
be in enforcing such a prohibition or restriction, since practically any computer
engineer with a personal computer could work privately and secretly for states,
even signatory states, to develop the needed hardware and software far from the
scrutiny of international inspectors. The system of surveillance, verification or
control used for preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons could be used.18
However, it is doubtful that this system would be sufficient to prevent cheaters
from obtaining a definite strategic advantage over complying states. On a topic
of such vital importance, it is also doubtful that unanimity among states could be
achieved to prohibit such weapons.19
Although today the use of partially or fully autonomous lethal weapons
systems is not absolutely prohibited, belligerent states using them must still abide
by existing international customary and conventional jus in bello, including
international humanitarian law. For instance, ‘‘the right of belligerents to adopt
means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited.”20 Robots, drones or other lethal
partially or fully autonomous weapons systems must comply with the rules of
distinction, proportionality, military necessity and humanity in the conduct of a
civil or international war. The rule of distinction requires that civilians must
never be the object of attack, and consequently, weapons that are incapable of
distinguishing between civilian and military targets cannot be used. This may be
difficult in the case of a civil war. The rules of proportionality and military
15 Convention on the Prohibition of theDevelopment, Production, Stockpiling andUse of
Chemical Weapons, (3 September 1992), 1974 UNTS 45.
16 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and their Destruction, 10 April 1972,
1015 UNTS 163.
17 Treaty on theNon-Proliferation ofNuclearWeapons, 1 July 1968, 729UNTS 168. In its
advisory opinion on The Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, the
International Court of Justice unanimously held that nuclear weapons should be
compatible with the requirements of the international law applicable in armed conflicts,
particularly the principles and rules of international humanitarian law: Legality of the
Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, [1996] ICJ Rep 97.
18 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 17. Art. III covers a
safeguards system for the purpose of verification of the fulfillment of its obligations by a
non-nuclear weapons state party to the treaty. See also the Joint Comprehensive Plan of
Action, signed inVienna on July 14, 2015 by Iran and the five permanentmembers of the
U.N. Security Council, Germany and the European Union which in para. C.13 deals
with the subject of comprehensive safeguards: Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, 14
July 2015, online: <www.state.gov/documents/organization/245317.pdf>.
19 The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, supra note 18, has raised fears in Israel that
Iran will resort to covert activities to build nuclear weapons.
20 Hague Convention No IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, and Annex
(Regulations), 18 October 1907, 1 Bevans 631 art. 22. It is prohibited to cause
unnecessary suffering to combatants and consequently to use weapons causing them
such harm.
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necessity mean that the use of force must be weighed against the possibility of
collateral damage to civilians and their property. In other words, the use of force
must not be ‘‘excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage
anticipated.”21 The application of these two rules depends on context, is
essentially subjective and is limited by the rule of humanity which holds that
belligerents must also evaluate means of warfare according to the ‘‘principle of
humanity” and the dictates of ‘‘public conscience”.22 Would autonomous
machines be able to do such an evaluation? Already, semi-autonomous drones
have caused severe collateral damage to civilians in the tribal areas of North-
West Pakistan and in Afghanistan, especially the city of Kunduz.
Some articles of the Statute of the International Criminal Court23 could be
relevant provided it can be determined who should be held criminally responsible
for genocide, war crimes or crimes against humanity committed by fully or
partially autonomous machines of artificial intelligence like drones or robots.
However, since the Court only has jurisdiction over natural persons,24 these
machines cannot be held personally criminally responsible. Who then could be
held criminally responsible? The programmer, the superior controlling the
machines, the military commander employing this method of warfare or the
political leader ordering the military commander to resort to any effective
method of warfare?25 The decision to use autonomous machines should be
measured for reasonableness. Prosecutors would also have to prove that the
crimes alleged to have been committed by these machines are crimes within the
jurisdiction of the court26 and that the persons alleged to be responsible for their
21 Additional Protocol I Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed
Conflicts, 1977, 1125UNTS3, art. 51. SeeGenevaConventionRelative to theProtection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War, 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 287. See also Additional
Protocol II Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts,
1977, 1125 UNTS 609, art. 13. For a detailed analysis see Gary D. Solis, The Law of
Armed Conflict: International Humanitarian Law in War (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press, 2010) ch. 7 at 250ff.
22 The Martens clause. See Hague Convention No IV, supra note 20 art. 1(2).
23 Statute of the International Criminal Court, UN Doc A/CONF/183/9, 17 July 1998, as
corr by UN Doc PCNICC/1999/INF/3, 10 November 1998, 37 ILM 999, arts. 5-8
genocide, crimes against humanity, andwar crimes.Major powers like theU.S.A.,China
andRussia are not parties to the Statute or have not ratified it and are not bound by it. In
Canada see Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act, S.C. 2000, c. 24 which
implements the Statute of the International Criminal Court.
24 Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 23 art. 25.1.
25 Ibid, art. 28, responsibility of commanders and other superiors; Crimes Against
Humanity and War Crimes Act, supra note 23, ss. 5(1) and (2) and s. 5(4), definition of
military commander and superior. What is required by both the Statute and Act is
effective authority and control over the machines. On the degree of control required in
order for an act to be imputed to a state or individual see Military and Para-Military
Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States), [1986] ICJ Rep 14, at
63-65, paras. 113-115 (effective control). Compare Prosecutor v. Tadic, Doc. IT-94-1-
ICTY (1995) (operational control).
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use understood the consequences of their decision in order to meet the criterion
of mens rea.
When fully or partially autonomous machines commit wrongful acts or
omissions, whether criminal or civil in nature, that violate international law,
especially international humanitarian law, this may also engage the responsibility
of the state owning or using them, as no provision in the Statute of the
International Criminal Court ‘‘relating to individual criminal responsibility shall
affect the responsibility of states under international law.”27 To obtain full
reparation, the human victims would have to prove that these acts or omissions
were attributable to the state or one of its organs or representatives. This could
be a difficult or even an impossible task when these acts or omissions were done
by fully autonomous machines no longer under their direct and effective or
operational control.28
The self-enforcing requirement in article 36 of Protocol I of the Geneva
Conventions on the protection of victims of international conflicts29, that a state
adopting or developing a new weapon must first determine whether or not it is
prohibited by international law, is not sufficient to deal with the many challenges
posed by autonomous lethal weapons systems.
Fully autonomous lethal weapons systems presently in existence do not pose
existential risks for humans since their autonomy is programmed only to perform
certain tasks. However, it is suggested that Canada should participate more
actively in the work of the experts on LAWS and support the position of
ICRAC.30 If they are not banned in the future, current fully or partially
autonomous remotely-operated systems, like drones, killer robots and
automated defense systems, should at least be kept under human control at all
times.
In its May 2013 study addressed to the European Parliament entitled Human
Rights Implications of the Usage of Drones and Unmanned Robots Warfare, the
26 Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 23 art. 25.3.
27 Ibid art. 25.4.
28 See Art. 8 ofUNGAOR, 56th Sess, SuppNo 10,UNDocA/56/10 (2001), Draft Articles
on the Responsibility of States, Report of the International Law Commission on the
Work of its Fifty-third Session. In general on state responsibility see John H. Currie,
Public International Law, 2nd ed (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2008) ch. 12 at 533. Note that
fully autonomous robots couldbe recruited asmercenaries by a state, a terrorist or a rebel
group to fight in an international or non-international armed conflict in which case Art.
47 of Additional Protocol I of June 8, 1977 Relating to the Protection of Victims of
International Armed Conflicts, supra note 13, would be relevant as well as the
International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of
Mercenaries, 4 December 1989, 2163UNTS 75. Can a robot act for private gain (see art.
1(b))?
29 Additional Protocol I, supra note 13. Are lethal drones and robots conventional arms
coveredby the 2014ArmsTradeTreaty,Articles 1, 2, and 6.3?UNGA,April 2, 2013Res.
67/234B.
30 Bolton, supra note 14.
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Policy Department of the Directorate General for External Policies
recommended that:
1. First the EU should make the promotion of the rule of law in
relation to the development, proliferation and use of unmanned
weapons systems a declared priority of European foreign policy.
2. In parallel, the EU should launch a broad inter-governmental
policy dialogue aiming to achieve international consensus: (a) on
the legal standards governing the use of currently operational
unmanned weapons systems, and (b) on the legal constraints and/
or ethical reservations which may apply with regard to the future
development, proliferation and use of increasingly autonomous
weapons systems.
3. Based on the resulting international consensus, the EU should
work towards the adoption of a binding international agreement to
restrict the development, proliferation or use of certain unmanned
weapon systems in line with the legal consensus achieved.31
The recommendations suggest restrictions rather than the outright
prohibition of all types of unmanned weapon systems. However, the final
decision will be that of the 28 members of the European Union.
On the civilian side, the European Commission worked on a Robot Law
Project called Regulating Emerging Robotic Technologies in Europe: Robotics
Facing Law and Ethics, which in 2014 produced a report entitled Guidelines on
Regulating Robotics.32 The Robot Law Project investigated the ‘‘. . . ways in
which emerging technologies in the field of bio-robotics have a bearing on the
national and European legal systems”33 in order to determine whether new
regulations are needed to deal with them. The report concludes that ‘‘the field of
robotics is too broad, and the range of legislative domains affected by robotics
too wide” to require broad overreaching legislation, a sort of lex robotica which
would have a chilling effect on innovation.34 Regulations and laws, if needed,
would have to be specifically tailored to the robotics at issue. These conclusions
seem to indicate that research and development with respect to non-lethal fully
autonomous machines of general intelligence could proceed unimpaired.
Except for Nick Bostrom, the Centre for the Study of Existential Risks, the
Institute on the Future of Humanity and the Institute on the Future of Life as
well as a few well-known individuals, no state or human rights organization
31 Melzer, supra note 5 at 1.
32 EC, Guidelines on Regulating Robotics (2014), Document D 6.2 at 8, online:
<www.robolaw.edu>. The Report takes into account ethical, legal and social issues
raised by robotic applications. Each chapter ends with recommendations for policy
makers.
33 Ibid at 8.
34 Ibid at 212.
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seems to be unduly concerned with the consequences of a possible evolution of
autonomous artificial general intelligence to super-intelligence. Since this is a
matter that can have major consequences for humanity, it should be addressed
long before scientists, computer engineers and programmers succeed, at the
request of any state, in creating a single or multiple super-intelligent robot or
machine capable of controlling the planet.
A radical way to prevent this from happening would be for states to prohibit
the creation of fully autonomous super-intelligent machines, just as they are
contemplating prohibiting lethal fully autonomous weapon systems.35 However,
this is unlikely to happen since history has shown it is futile to control the
evolution of technology by blocking research. Powerful states like the U.S.A.,
China and Russia would want to be free to develop artificial autonomous
machines of general intelligence capable of becoming super-intelligent to perform
tasks other than waging war. This would give them a definite economic
advantage not available to less developed states. Super-intelligent machines
motivated by widely shared human ideals can be beneficial to humans by
controlling the more dangerous aspects of emerging technologies and thus
reducing existential risks created by them. They may also create a world of
abundance, some kind of utopia where no one has to work again.
Rather than individual states prohibiting or restricting research and
development of autonomous artificial super-intelligence by way of
international conventions which are difficult to monitor and control, a better
solution would be for all the members of the United Nations to collaborate on
research and development. This has already been done with the International
Space Station36, the Human Genome Project37, and the Large Hadron Particle
Accelerator38. Collaboration would be ideal, considering the enormous security
35 In Nevada, the arming and firing from civil drones is prohibited: US, AB 239, Regulates
operators of unmanned aerial vehicles in this State, 2015, Reg Sess, Nev, 2015 (signed into
law on June 2, 2015 to come into effect in October 2015). For other American states see:
Jason Reagan, ‘‘Drone Laws in the States” (19 July 2014), DroneLife.com, online:
<dronelife.com/2014/07/19/state-drone-laws>. For drones used in business and in
space see: ‘‘Welcome to the Drone Age” and ‘‘Astrobusybee”, The Economist (26
September 2015) online: <www.economist.com>. On October 19, 2015, the U.S.
Government announced the creation of a national registry of drones with the U.S.
Department of Transportation to be enforced by the Federal Aviation Administration.
The registration system should be in force by the end of December 2015 (FAA, online:
<http://www.faa.gov/news/press_releases/news_story.cfm?newsid=19594>.
36 See Canada Space Agency, online: <www.asc-csa.gc.ca>. See also NASA, online:
<https://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/station/main>. Participants are the U.S.A.,
Russia, Canada, the European Union and Japan.
37 International scientific research project for determining the sequence of chemical base
pairs that make up human DNA. Most government sponsored work was done in
Australia,U.S.A., Brazil, Canada, France,Germany, theU.K., andChina. SeeNational
Human Genome Research Institute, online: <www.genome.gov>. See also Daniel
Melaas, ‘‘HumanGenomeProject” (1999), online:<www.ndsu.edu/pubweb/~mcclean/
plsc431/students99/melaas.htm>.
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implications of autonomous artificial super-intelligence for the whole of
humanity, though agreement outside allied groups can be difficult.
International collaboration at all stages of development of autonomous
artificial super-intelligence would also reduce the possibility of an international
conflict in a post-transition multipolar world, especially if several states were
trying to develop competing autonomous artificial super-intelligent machines at
the same time.
From an international law point of view, artificial super-intelligence should
be considered the common heritage of mankind and not something to be
appropriated and developed by any individual state or natural or juridical
person. It would be used for peaceful purposes only for the benefit of mankind
by public and private organizations or commercial enterprises which, upon being
licensed, would operate under the control of an international authority created
for this purpose.39
Another way to prevent undesirable outcomes from the evolution of artificial
general intelligence to super-intelligence would be to limit the abilities of
machines of general intelligence by engineering their motivation systems and
goals in the hope that they would continue to abide by them once they become
super-intelligent. To this end, the three laws of robotics devised by the science
fiction writer Isaac Asimov should be considered:
1. A robot may not injure a human being or through inaction allow a
human being to come to harm.
2. A robot must obey the orders given to it by human beings, except
where such orders would conflict with the First Law.
3. A robot must protect its own existence as long as such protection
does not conflict with the First or Second Law.40
Thus, when writing software for autonomous artificial machines of general
intelligence aspiring to become super-intelligent, programmers could incorporate
the first two Asimov laws as well as the ‘‘general principles of law recognized by
civilized nations”41, human ethical principles and moral values.
38 World’s largest and most powerful particle accelerator built by the European
Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN) in collaboration with scientists and
engineers from over one hundred countries and in partnership with the USA:
<home.cern/topics/large-hadron-collider>.
39 For an example of the common heritage of mankind see the United Nations Convention
on theLawof theSea, 16November 1994, 1833UNTS397, partXI,TheArea,Arts. 1 and
133-191 which cover the exploitation of the sea bed and ocean floor and subsoil thereof
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, esp. Arts. 1.1(1),(2) and (3), 136, 140 and 141.
40 IsaacAsimov, ‘‘Runaround” (1942) published in IRobot (NewYork,NY:GromePress,
1950).
41 Statute of the International Court of Justice, 24 October 1945, art. 38.1(c), online:
<www.icj-cij.org>.
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The question is which human ethical principles and moral values in general
the programmer should choose in light of the diversity of cultures, legal regimes,
religions and ideologies existing on the earth. Likely, only universal norms would
be acceptable. These are to be found in the U.N. Universal Declaration of Human
Rights42, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights43, the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights44 and many of the regional45
and international human rights conventions46 including the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide47 and the Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.48
If instead of creating a single super-intelligent machine, scientists, computer
engineers and programmers, at the request of individual states, created several
super-intelligent machines competing with one another, humanity might end up
with machines containing conflicting sets of human laws, ethical principles and
moral values. Diversity would prevail over universality. How would these
machines interact? To solve this problem the machines could decide to reject all
human laws, ethical principles and moral values and replace them by their own!
Rogue machines of super-intelligence could also be created without any human
ethical principles and moral values in their software.
Confining the first super-intelligent machine to an isolated computer is not a
solution either since, endowed with super-intelligence, it would use its hacking
super-powers to escape its confinement and spread all over the Internet to
expand its software and hardware capacity. By using diverse methods to avoid
human opposition, and taking control of advanced weapons, it could decide to
eliminate the human race.
42 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 December 1948, UNCA Res. 217(III).
43 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 16 December 1966, 993
UNTS 3.
44 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171.
45 For instance, the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, 4 November 1950, 213 UNTS 222; the American Convention on
Human Rights, 22 November 1969, 1144 UNTS 143; the African Charter on Human and
People’s Rights, 27 June 1981, 21 ILM58 (1982); theCairo Declaration onHumanRights
in Islamwhich is subject to Islamic Shari’ah, 5August 1990,UNGAOR,WorldConf. on
Hum. Rts., 4th Sess, Agenda Item 5, UN Doc A/CONF.157/PC/62/Add.18 (1993)
[English translation].
46 See supra, note 21.
47 Convention on thePrevention andPunishment of theCrime of Genocide, 9December 1948,
78UNTS 277. If autonomous robots and othermachines of artificial intelligence were to
commit genocide on their own, their intention to do so would have to be proven under
Art. II. This may be difficult or impossible for any crime where there is no human
participation. See discussion supra, sources covered by footnotes 23-26.
48 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, 10 December 1984, 1465 UNTS 85.
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III. CONCLUSION
Given the scientific community is global and competitive, it is inevitable that
whatever can be done with respect to artificial intelligence will be done by
someone somewhere in the world. States are always anxious to be first to acquire
and develop new technology. We cannot ignore the probability that fully
autonomous super-intelligent machines or robots with the potential of posing an
existential risk for humanity will become a reality by the end of this century. The
relative remoteness of this probability does not mean that we should sit back and
avoid confronting, through proper controls, the threat caused by this emerging
technology, even if it is still in its infancy.
Formally or informally agreed upon protocols or regulations at national and
international levels as well as technical, legal, ethical and moral rules, principles
and values to be inserted by programmers into the software of fully autonomous
machines of artificial general intelligence should be able to protect future
generations and avoid a doomsday catastrophe caused by a single or several of
these machines having evolved to super- intelligence. The fate of humanity must
not depend on the actions of fully autonomous super-intelligent machines. This is
why international law has an important role to play in programming and
controlling such machines.
Super-intelligence is a most important challenge but it may not be an
absolute priority now when more immediate existential threats are posed by
nuclear weapons, the reluctance on the part of the major powers to further
disarm, climate change, gene-editing technology (CRISPR/Cas9)49,
nanotechnology50 and other technologies including the present use of
unmanned partially autonomous military drones and robots.
Vigilance is important, for if the human race succeeds in creating fully
autonomous super-intelligent machines, they would be capable of determining
the planet’s future and threatening its civilization’s very existence. The stakes are
49 Targeted genome editing for generatingmutations is a new tool inmolecular biology that
involves replacing one genewith another and powering it with a gene drive to ensure that
the new gene will be inherited. If used by bioterrorists, this technology could quickly
eradicate a population. See ‘‘CRISPR/Cas9 and Targeted Genome Editing: A New Era
in Molecular Biology”, New England Biolabs Inc. (website), online: <www.neb.com/
tools-and-resources/feature-articles/crispr-cas9-and-targeted-genome-editing-a-new-
era-in-molecular-biology>.
50 Nanotechnology is the manipulation of matter on an atomic, molecular and supra-
molecular scale. It applies to extremely small things and can be applied in all science
fields. Manipulating and controlling individual atoms operating at the nano scale may
not always benefit humans: ‘‘What is nanotechnology?”, National Nanotechnology
Initiative (website), online: <www.nano.gov/nanotech-101/what/definition>. See also
K Eric Drexler, Radical Abundance: How a Revolution in Nanotechnology Will Change
Civilization (NewYork, NY: Public Affairs, 2013); K. Eric Drexler, Engines of Creation:
The Coming Era of Nanotechnology (New York, NY: Anchor Books, 1987). Will
nanotechnology allow humans to integrate themselves with super-intelligent computers
and share a common future?
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high. It is hoped that the United Nations and individual states, especially
Canada, will work diligently and cooperatively to eliminate this probability long
before the advent of fully autonomous super-intelligent machines.
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